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Abstract 
The article considers the specific mode of visualization that is at work in 
contemporary border security practices. Taking inspiration from art historian Jonathan 
Crary’s genealogies of attention, it situates homeland security visuality in a particular 
economy of attention or attentiveness to the world. How is it that we come to focus on 
some elements of our way of life, establish them as normal and designate deviations 
from the norm? How does this algorithmic attentiveness break up the visual field, 
‘pixelating’ sensory data so that it can be reintegrated to project a picture of a person? 
The pre-emptive lines of sight emerging in contemporary security practice, like the 
heroine in Richard Flanigan’s novel The Unknown Terrorist, become precisely a 
means of visualizing the unknown future. The article concludes with reflections on the 
creative artistic forms of attention that flourish even where the lines of sight of the 
consumer, the citizen, the border guard, the traveller, the migrant appears ever more 
directed and delimited. It is in these more creative modes of attention that we find one 
of the most important resources to contemporary political life – the capacity to 
question the ‘better picture’, to disrupt what we see as ordinary or out of the ordinary 
and confront the routines of our lives anew.  
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Lines of Sight: On the Visualization of Unknown Futures1
 
We use this data to focus on behavior, not race and ethnicity. In fact, what it 
allows us to do is move beyond crude profiling based on prejudice, and look at 
conduct and communication and actual behavior as a way of determining who 
we need to take a closer look at. (US Secretary for Homeland Security Michael 
Chertoff 2007, emphasis added). 
“The thing about raster graphics”, Tariq was saying, “is that you can precisely 
manipulate an image by altering a single dot at a time […] What they’d like to 
do with real people if they could. I work on bitmaps to make better pictures. 
That’s raster graphics […].” 
She remembered what Tariq had said to her – how it was what they would like 
to do with real people if they could. But Tariq only changed images, dot by dot 
[…] They were doing something far bolder: turning her from a woman into 
cartoons, headlines, opinions, fears, fate. They were morphing her pixel by 
pixel into what she wasn’t, the unknown terrorist. (Richard Flanigan, The 
Unknown Terrorist 2006: 76, 260).  
 
Introduction: Making better pictures 
 
Following the conviction and sentencing of the British ‘fertilizer bombers’ in May 
2007, the US Secretary for Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, spoke publicly 
about the need to create better pictures of unknown terrorists in advance of their 
arrival on US shores. In his lecture at Johns Hopkins University, Chertoff placed his 
emphasis on how to decide what to focus on, who to look at, which suspicious 
behaviour is deserving of attention. The significance of his comments far exceeds the 
specific context of airline passenger data that he is addressing here,2 embodying a 
novel and politically significant move in the very visuality of the war on terror. What 
do these data represent that they can be assumed to so nearly capture a picture of 
someone who has not yet been seen, who would not otherwise be recognised? If 
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Chertoff is correct and these pixelated people are not seen through racial or other 
categorises that are prejudicial, then what are the implications of living with a digital 
alter ego that, with the contemporary faith in techno-science, cannot be spurned? 
 
The short answer is that the individuated items of data that have become the mainstay 
of the homefront of the war on terror appear as the ‘dots’ that, if only they can be 
successfully joined up, are assumed to reveal a picture of an unknown terrorist. Most 
often derived from the residue of daily life left in the patterns of travel, financial and 
consumer transactions (Amoore and de Goede 2005; 2008), these abstracted items of 
data become the nodal points that, when joined in association with other items, are 
assumed to become an indisputable visualization of a person. It is not strictly, then, a 
picture or a snapshot of a person that is taken – an image from a specific and limited 
temporal standpoint – rather, it is a projected line of sight that seeks to capture the 
“unknown unknowns”.3 As in Richard Flanigan’s startlingly observant novel, The 
Unknown Terrorist, just as the contemporary consumer is targeted via simulated or 
projected images of her dreams and desires, so the citizen who becomes terrorist 
suspect finds her real self eclipsed by the projected picture of a dangerous and 
disturbed body, “morphing pixel by pixel”, “becoming what she was not”. Like the 
screened visualizations of migrants and travellers that allow the “border guard to 
become the last and not the first line of defence”, or the London Underground 
pedestrian surveillance systems that “mean you don’t have to watch the screen all the 
time”, how we see, who we see, to what we give our attention, takes on renewed 
significance (Department of Homeland Security 2004; New Scientist 2003).  
 
As decisions based on human lines of sight are integrated with computer encoded 
visualizations, authorities begin to claim that the calculated projections of a person 
could never be racialized or otherwise violent or prejudicial, and are no longer a 
matter of profiling. In fact, Chertoff’s claims for the data visualizations of an air 
passenger were made in the context of a stark choice he presented between denying 
British citizens “of Pakistani origin” the right to visa waiver – categorizing British 
citizenship into degrees of risk, singling out those “potentially dangerous people” to 
whom “we should pay greater attention”, – and the acceptance of a system of data 
mining that already identifies past travel to Pakistan and specific name algorithms, 
among many other associations,  as “dangerous” (Chertoff 2007b). The choice here, 
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of course, is no choice at all, for the algorithmic calculation of who should be looked 
at more closely simply redraws the lines between those with entitlement (to visa, to 
cross a border, to be in a public place without disclosure of purpose) and those 
without. In short, the visa waiver effectively already is withdrawn from many British 
citizens by other means – via a picture “based on behaviour not background” 
(Chertoff 2007b).    
 
The deployment in the war on terror of ways of life, broadly defined – conduct, 
behaviour, social custom, movement across a railway platform or airport terminal – is, 
in many ways, nothing new or significant. Recall in the aftermath of 9/11 how the 
routines of daily life were called up as a source of resilience. “We were told to shop”, 
says Susan Willis, “shop to show we are patriotic Americans. Shop to show our 
resilience over death and destruction” (2003: 122). The London bombings on July 7 
met with similar celebrations of the “vibrant and resilient city, getting back to normal, 
going back to work, getting back on the Tube”. Yet, there is a need to be cautious 
with the treatment of culture in the practices of homeland security. Culture, Derek 
Gregory explains “is never a mere mirror of the world”, we can never simply hold up 
the looking glass of culture to shed new light on contemporary economy or society. 
Rather, “culture involves the production, circulation and legitimation of meanings 
through representations, practices and performances that enter fully into the 
constitution of the world” (2004: 11). In the specific and situated circumstances I am 
interested in here, culture embodies and advances an economy – a means of 
apportioning, segregating, singling out for our collective attentions. How do ways of 
life come to be known and recognised as such? How is a ‘normal’ way of life settled 
out, and how does it identify deviations from norm? What does the call to 
attentiveness to ‘conduct’ or ‘behaviour’ ask us to pay attention to? How do we know 
what it is that we should pay attention to? As in contemporary profiling of consumers 
in the marketplace – where the as-yet-unencountered unknown consumer is the holy 
grail sought via fragments of data on their conduct and behaviour – so in today’s 
homeland security practice, the unknown terrorist is rendered knowable through the 
fractured bits and bytes of a way of life. 
 
In this article, I consider this economy of attention or attentiveness to the world, how 
it is that we come to focus on some elements of our way of life, establish them as 
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normal and designate deviations from the norm. How does this attentiveness break up 
the visual field, ‘pixelating’ sensory data so that it can be reintegrated to build a 
picture of a person? Throughout, I am inspired by the work of art historian Jonathan 
Crary, whose careful and detailed genealogies of attention and its role in human 
subjectivity have urged us to consider that modern sensory stimuli are not primarily 
about making a subject see, but about “strategies of isolation and separation” (1999: 
3). Understood in this way, lines of sight are not only about the vigilant modes of 
visual culture I have discussed elsewhere (Amoore 2007), but they are also lines that 
segregate and divide, “dividing practices” that render ways of life economic, make 
them amenable to management, trading, or exchange.  
 
I begin by thinking through what it means to ‘pay attention’ in the context of 
calculable lines of sight that coalesce commercial and security practices. I then move 
to consider how individuated ‘dots’ of data become reintegrated into the visualization 
of a person, how it is precisely that the unknown risk comes to be perceived. 
Throughout, I am interested in how this mode of attentiveness targets, how it draws 
disparate elements of life into close association in order to designate the ‘norm’ and to 
project what is abnormal or out of the ordinary. Finally, I conclude by reflecting on 
the creative forms of attention that flourish even where the attentiveness of the 
consumer, the citizen, the border guard, the traveller, the migrant appears ever more 
directed and delimited. It is in these more creative modes of attention that we find one 
of the most important resources to contemporary political life – the capacity to 
question the ‘better picture’, to disrupt what we see as ordinary or out of the ordinary 
and confront the routines of our lives anew.  
 
 
Because culture has an economy: are you paying attention? 
  
Among the careful plastic-windowed advertising posters on the London Underground 
– “register for Oystercard and get 10% off in London’s museums and galleries”; enter 
an art competition and design a future Tube station; download coupons to your mobile 
phone – the Metropolitan Police Anti-terrorist hotline posters call us to attention: “if 
you suspect it, report it”; “look out for unusual or suspicious activity”; “use all your 
senses”; “you are that someone”. In so many ways already part of the prosaic and 
 5
unnoticed sensory backdrop to the daily commute, the specific call for attention at the 
homefront of the war on terror asks us to single out, from the cacophony of 
background noise in public spaces, that which demands a closer look, that which is 
out of the ordinary. How should we understand this mode of attentiveness? Indeed, is 
it of significance at all? As art historian Jonathan Crary has argued, the significance of 
attention and attentiveness to the world is not merely cultural, not confined in its 
implications to the histories of visual culture. Rather, modes of attention and 
attentiveness are also acutely material – central in modern times to the way that ways 
of life, culture and cultural difference are made governable. What we see, how we see, 
what is made visible, how visualization occurs – these are not simply the cultural 
dimensions of a material life, but instead they are the very essence of an economy of 
culture. That is to say, practices of attention themselves embody an economy – a 
means of representing and acting on the world such that it can be apportioned, 
segregated, annexed, exchanged or interchanged. As Crary writes on attentiveness, it 
is “not primarily concerned with looking at images but rather with the construction of 
conditions that individuate, immobilize, and separate subjects, even within a world in 
which mobility and circulation are ubiquitous” (1999: 74). In this sense, practices of 
attention are one specific means of instituting the dividing practices at the heart of 
contemporary techniques of government.4  
 
As the contemporary global economy has sought to incorporate practices of attention, 
perception and affective judgement ever mode closely into circuits of production and 
consumption – promoting touch-button ‘interactivity’, placing the screen in the palm 
of the hand, engaging playfully with the consumer – so, at the same time the state’s 
security practices have sought to mobilize culture broadly defined – ways of life, 
looking out for the out of the ordinary, sifting the patterns of life left in transit or 
consumer transactions, providing hotlines for people’s reported unease or suspicion. 
Thus, London Metropolitan police’s ‘if you suspect it’ campaigns offer the transaction 
receipt as one fragment of a picture of a person that could be built; the mobile phone 
images and video clips from the 2005 London bombings are translated from “careless 
cinema” into the data-driven analysis of actionable intelligence (Sinclair 2005); the 
flotsam residue of our travel bookings on global reservations databases are extradited 
to the US authorities.5 Across these apparently disparate domains there is a resonance 
in ever more finite targeting of behaviours, conduct, the actions and inferred 
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intentions of people. Someone as yet unknown is apparently identified and made 
visible, literally ‘brought to attention’, singled out and immobilized while all around 
him moves on.     
 
Though the emergence of novel forms of attentiveness stretches across a spectrum of 
practices – from appeals to citizen ‘readiness’ and states of alert (Isin 2004; Hay and 
Andrejevic 2006), to the algorithmic calculations made on the screens of counter-
terror ‘hotlines’, and the vast screening of prosaic daily transactions for the ever-
attentive ‘watch list’ – there are a number of points of resonance that enter all of these 
different modes of attention. 
 
Contemporary forms of attentiveness are predominantly screened ways of perceiving 
and attending to the world. The interface of the screen – whether windscreen, mobile 
phone or PDA screen, computer screen, or security ‘pre-screening’ – has become an 
important site where sovereign decisions (who belongs to the nation, who is 
dangerous to ‘us’, what the ‘other’ looks like) are made. “The screen”, writes Kaja 
Silverman, “is the site at which social and historical difference enters the field of 
vision” (1996: 135). It is not only that the screen becomes the mode of visual 
communication of difference, though of course this is important. Instead, the screen 
itself enters into the constitution and performance of difference. So, when the British 
government rejects the US move to deny visas to Britons of Pakistani ‘origin’, but 
accepts instead “screening at their end, sharing intelligence with the Americans” and 
“deporting Britons who failed screening once they arrived at an airport in the US” 
(New York Times 2007), they defer a decision based on racial categories into a 
screened calculation based on ever more finite classifications of difference. The 
computer screen, understood this way, as Anne Friedberg has shown, “is both a ‘page’ 
and a ‘window’, at once opaque and transparent”. The flat surface of the screen, the 
‘page’ that represents the calculation in this instance, is given depth by the layers and 
leaves of data, the multiple other screens and screenings that may appear transparent 
to the viewer but remain opaque to the person who is displayed there. The surface of 
the screen has, then “a deep virtual reach to archives and databases, indexed and 
accessible with barely the stroke of a finger” (Friedberg 2006: 19). 
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The screened forms of attention that are dominating contemporary homeland security 
practice function through a process of ‘screening out’. That is to say, they take large 
quantities of data, multiple sources of stimuli, and they sort and classify that which 
will appear on the surface. Inside the 34 ‘surface’ items of airline passenger data in 
passenger name records, for example, are multiple layers of pieces of a persons life, 
integrated together via pre-screening programmes such as USVISIT, to produce a 
picture of a person’s posed risk to security. It is, of course, only pixelated fragments 
that enter the visualization, vast quantities of data simultaneously fall out of the 
calculation, become ‘background noise’ and are screened out. In many ways this 
focusing of attention via the annulment of other sensory data is integral to the 
histories of practices of perception: 
 
Whether it is how we behave in front of the luminous screen of a computer or 
how we experience a performance in an opera house, how we accomplish 
certain productive or creative tasks or how we more passively perform routine 
activities like driving a car or watching television, we are in a dimension of 
contemporary experience that requires that we effectively cancel out or 
exclude from consciousness much of our immediate environment (Crary 1999: 
1).  
 
For Crary, the way that we have come to focus our attention on particular items, tasks 
or people cannot be understood without also acknowledging the processes that cancel 
out or exclude other stimuli. When we attend to one set of sensory data, in order to 
make it count we necessarily discount other sources. Crary identifies a critical turning 
point in the mid nineteenth century, when scientific knowledge about how an 
embodied observer sees and perceives the world “disclosed possible ways that vision 
was open to procedures of normalization” (1999: 12; see also Crary 1992). It is 
precisely this normalization within practices of attention that is at work in the 
visuality of homeland security. When the call is to look for that which is abnormal, 
out of the ordinary, or when the data on an individual is sorted according to patterns 
of normality and deviation, most of the detail behind the data is cancelled out.  
Conduct and behaviour that could, if attended to or seen differently, be an integral 
part of the ‘norm’, becomes part of the conduct and behaviour designated deviant 
from norm and rendered suspicious. Thus, what might be expected to be ‘normal’ 
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patterns of travel or financial transactions for a British citizen with family in Pakistan 
– travel to visit relatives, wire transfers of monetary gifts, telephone calls – will, 
within the screened attentiveness to passenger data, be designated suspicious. Like 
Richard Flanagan’s protagonist, ‘the Doll’ in his novel The Unknown Terrorist, 
whose careful earnings from lapdancing are hidden in her apartment – savings to buy 
a house, to find the security and prosperity that is promised to the prudent citizen – 
what would be the norm becomes deviant, the cash becomes evidence of “a cell 
financing its activities through drug running and the sex industry” (2006: 231).  
    
 
In close association: attending to difference 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the homeland face of the war on terror identified 
an enemy whose probable future actions were already visible in the traces of life left 
in existing data. Giving evidence at a US Congressional hearing only five months 
after 9/11, IBM’s federal business manager testified that “in this war, our enemies are 
hiding in open and available information across a spectrum of databases” (Intelligent 
Enterprise 2002: 8). Technology consultants and IT providers such as IBM have made 
the generation of probabilistic association rules the forefront of homeland security 
practices. The idea is that locating regularities in large and disparate patterns of data 
can enable associations to be established between apparently ‘suspicious’ people, 
places, financial transactions, cargo shipments and so on (Ericson 2007). Rules of 
association are produced by algorithms – models or “decision trees” for a calculation 
(Quinlan 1986). In effect, algorithms precisely function as a means of directing and 
disciplining attention, focusing on specific points and cancelling out all other data, 
appearing to make it possible to translate probable associations between people or 
objects into actionable security decisions. In 2003, for example, a US joint inquiry 
concluded that “on September 11, enough relevant data was resident in existing 
databases”, so that “had the dots been connected”, the events could have been 
“exposed and stopped” (2003: 14). It is precisely this ‘connecting of dots’ that is the 
work of the algorithm. By connecting the dots of probabilistic associations, the 
algorithm becomes a means of foreseeing or anticipating a course of events yet to take 
place: 
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If we learned anything from September 11 2001, it is that we need to be better 
at connecting the dots of terrorist-related information. After September 11, we 
used credit card and telephone records to identify those linked with the 
hijackers. But wouldn’t it be better to identify such connections before a 
hijacker boards a plane? 
(US Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff 2006). 
 
The algorithm appears to make possible the conversion of ex post facto evidence in 
the war on terror into a judgement made in advance of the event. The significant point 
here is that diverse data points or specified ‘pixels’ in a digital image are drawn 
together in association, producing a recognisable whole. Though the visualized image 
may bear no resemblance to the actual way of life of the person depicted, this scarcely 
matters because the digital alter ego becomes the de facto person. As the US Inspector 
General concluded in his survey of government applications of algorithmic 
techniques, “association does not imply a direct causal connection”, but instead it 
“uncovers, interprets and displays relationships between persons, places and events” 
(Department of Homeland Security 2006: 10). It is the specific visualization of threat, 
then, that marks out the algorithm as a distinctive mode of calculation – to be 
displayed on the screens of border guards, stored on subway travel cards, shared 
between multiple public and private agencies. In this sense, the algorithm produces a 
screened visualization of suspicion, on the basis of which ‘other’ people are 
intercepted, detained, stopped and searched. 
 
The origins of algorithmic techniques for visualizing people lie, perhaps not 
surprisingly, in commercial techniques for imagining the consumer. In the early 1990s 
IBM mathematicians began to work on using bar code data on consumer purchases to 
project probabilistic judgements about the ways of life of the customer in a given 
scenario (cf. Agrawal et al 1993). The point here was not to be able to predict future 
patterns on the basis of past data, indeed the commercial clients categorically did not 
want predictability or to capture an already predictable customer. Instead, the dream 
was to visualize the impulse buyer, the capricious lifestyle of the unknown consumer 
who might be drawn into the targeting of the marketeers. Though the uncertainties of 
future patterns are not treated as strictly knowable, they are seen to be at least 
amenable to pre-emptive decision making based on the visualized person. 
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 It is precisely this model of pre-emptive visualization of an unknown person that is 
now running through the logics of homeland security, indeed IBM’s same team is 
now leading the “mathematical sciences role in homeland security” (BMSA 2004), 
with IBM prominent contractors on Heathrow airport’s MySense biometrics 
programme and on the trials for the UK’s e-borders Semaphore and Iris programmes 
(DHS 2005; Computing 2004: 1). Though programmes of this kind have attracted 
attention for their surveillant nature, with the implications for privacy and civil 
liberties this holds, I want to suggest that they are not primarily surveillant modes of 
seeing. Rather than strictly technologies that ‘watch’, taking a metaphorical snapshot 
or photograph in a specific spatio-temporal context, these are techniques of 
visualization. They project an image and they project it forward in time, displaying 
their mobility on the ubiquitous screen. As Friedrich Kittler has argued compellingly, 
projections are produced from fragments of visual data, from individually isolated 
characteristics that are then selected, differentiated and reintegrated into a visual 
whole (1997). Of course, gaps persist between the lines that join the pixilated dots. 
These gaps, though, are filled with mobile and projected images that produce a 
seamless whole. Describing the illusion of a moving picture that is produced in the 
cinematic process of projecting still frames, Anne Friedberg suggests “for motion to 
be reconstituted, its virtual rendition relies on a missing element, a perceptual process 
that depends on the darkness between the frames” (2006: 92; see also Friedberg 
2002). To state my argument simply here, a visualized image of a person requires 
some gaps and invisibilities, these are simply filled in by the observer. The projected 
image, then, is extraordinarily difficult to challenge or expose – as Richard Flanigan’s 
‘Doll’ discovers, when the fragments of her life are reintegrated to project an 
unrecognizable whole, “she becomes what she is not”. 
 
It is important at this point to emphasise the ambiguity of practices of attention and 
attentiveness. It is not the case that these are wholly disciplinary practices that act on 
and through us and our lives. As Crary has argued, though industrialization and the 
market economy saw “perception function in a way that insures a subject is 
productive, manageable, and predictable, able to be socially integrated and adaptive”, 
simultaneously the management of attention reached limits characterised by more 
“creative states of deep absorption and daydreaming” (1999: 4-5). So, whilst the 
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conduct of commerce and trade required particular attentive habits, it stimulated also 
the more creative and subjective ways of seeing that flourished in the arts (1999: 52). 
 
Arguably, in terms of attentiveness and the visualization of people, something 
interesting and politically challenging is also happening at the intersection of these 
‘productive’ and ‘creative’ domains of attention. There can be little doubt that 
projected futures are experienced as both dangers and desires. As media theorist 
Jordan Crandall has argued: 
 
Being-seen is an ontological necessity; we strive to be accounted for within 
the dominant representational matrices of our time. We are not only talking 
about a gaze that is intrusive and controlling. We are talking about a gaze that 
provides the condition for action – the gaze for which one acts (2005: 20). 
 
Consider, for example, the luxury fashion brand Prada and, specifically, the 
architectures of their New York flagship store. The glass walled building, stretching 
one block and opening up inside with spaces to walk around, see and be seen, the 
store replaces displays of visible products with technologies that connect the 
consumer’s sense of identity to future Prada projections of the person. The radio 
frequency identification (RFID) tags inside the clothing send radio signals to a screen 
in the fitting rooms, triggering images of the clothing as seen on the catwalk. The 
glass walls of the dressing room change in phases from transparent to opaque, and 
large video screens “replace mirrors to show your back and side views live” (Kang 
and Cuff 2005: 121). The miniaturized sensor technologies embedded in the clothing 
and in store cards and credit cards provide focal points to be connected together in the 
visualization of the consumer. As these same RFID technologies are now inserted into 
passports and immigration documents, providing a route of identification into a 
visualized person, we see both commercial and security drives to become attentive to 
the element of surprise, the unpredictable or impulsive act.  
 
In this sense, algorithmic techniques for making visible mobile people, and indeed 
products, goods and money, embody what Samuel Weber calls a “target of 
opportunity”, a competitive “seizing” of “targets that were not foreseen or planned” 
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(2005: 4). The targets of opportunity in the war on terror, then, involve the depiction 
of unknown and mobile enemies: 
 
However different the war on terror was going to be from traditional wars, 
with their relatively well-defined enemies, it would still involve one of the 
basic mechanisms of traditional hunting and combat, in however modified and 
modernized a form: namely “targeting”. The enemy would have to be 
identified and localized, named and depicted, in order to be made into an 
accessible target… None of this was, per se, entirely new. What was, however, 
was the mobility, indeterminate structure, and unpredictability of the spatio-
temporal medium in which such targets had to be sited… In theatres of conflict 
that had become highly mobile and changeable, “targets” and “opportunity” 
were linked as never before. 
 (Weber 2005: 3-4, emphasis in original). 
 
Samuel Weber’s key point of discussion is the theatre of war, though his argument 
sheds significant light on the modes of attentiveness that I depict here. The 
identification, localization, naming and depiction of mobile targets is, in this war by 
other means, conducted in and through daily life, in advance of any possible future 
strike or intervention. The targeting of unknown people is, put simply, becoming a 
matter of both positioning in the sights (targeting and identifying) and visualizing 
through a projected line of sight (pre-empting, making actionable). Just as Prada’s 
customers are targeted via electronic tag identifiers and visualized via screened future 
images of their clothing, so the migrant or traveller is both targeted and anticipated – 
identified via their personal data and projected forward so that their digital shadow 
arrives at the border before they do. Algorithmic ‘decision trees’ draw even the most 
overloaded sensory domains into apparent management: the busy and noisy border 
crossing is stilled on the border guard’s screened list of ‘selectees’ to single out for 
further attention; the crowded subway ticket hall quietly selects anomalous smartcard 
data and intercepts at the barrier; the RFID data from a football fan’s swipecard 
transmits an automatic signal to the local police. From the visualization of a person is 
derived the possibility to act on that person. “Ideally, I would like to know”, said 
Michael Chertoff, “did Mohamed Atta get his ticket paid on the same credit card. That 
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would be a huge thing. And I really would like to know that in advance, because that 
would allow us to identify an unknown terrorist” (New York Times 2006b). 
 
In fact, of course, the algorithmic ‘decision trees’ do not take decisions at all, they 
merely defer decision into a calculation that is pre-programmed.6 While they appear 
to visualize a picture of a person that is culturally nuanced – every minute and prosaic 
“behaviour”, every aspect of a way of life potentially becoming a part of the 
classification – they actually efface difference in their drive for identification. The 
logic of association rules appears to be peculiarly dependent on culture, yet it is a 
representation of culture that attends too (and makes us attentive to) some aspects of 
sameness and difference, whilst always failing to confront the agonistic difference at 
the heart of political life (Connolly 1991: 170-171). The claims that visualizations 
used in place of ‘face-to-face’ pictures avoid racial profiling and other prejudicial 
judgements cannot be upheld. It is always through the visualization of the identity of 
the ‘other’ that the sanctity of ‘we the nation’, ‘we the people’ is sustained. As 
Connolly puts it, the “self reassurance of identity” is made “through the construction 
and otherness” and this otherness is readily adopted as the “definition of difference” 
(1991: 9). The algorithmic attentiveness, then, becomes the “multicultural”7 society’s 
technology of choice precisely because it gives the appearance of living alongside 
difference, of deciding without prejudice – “we are interested in behaviour not 
background”; “this is not racial profiling”; “we prefer screening to visa restrictions”; 
“no more border guards taking decisions based on appearance” – when in fact it 
categorizes, isolates and annexes in ways that conceal the violence inside the glossy 
wrapper of techno-science.   
 
There is an intensely important political problem here, then. We are faced with a 
technique of governing that makes humane, responsible or ethical ways of paying 
attention to the world extraordinarily difficult. Consider, for example, Waverly 
Cousin, former police officer and one of the 43 000 “screeners” employed by the US 
Transportation Security Administration to deploy the “screening passengers by 
observation technique” (SPOT) at airports, ports and border crossings. “The 
observation of human behaviour is probably the hardest thing to defeat”, explains 
Waverley, “you just don’t know what I am going to see” (New York Times 2006a). 
We do not know what he is going to see because the ‘SPOT’ calculation, while it 
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engages all of the time in the visualization of what Dana Cuff (2003) calls an “object 
of interest”, is itself always invisible and never an object of interest. Because in 
algorithmic modes of attention every ordinary everyday act becomes itself a means of 
settling out the norm and identifying the other that is anomalous, a responsible 
decision that, in Derrida’s (1994) terms, “advances where it cannot see”, is 
particularly elusive. What becomes important politically, I want to suggest in my 
concluding section, is the capacity precisely to intervene in what we do not know in 
what we see, and to mobilize a different form of attentiveness that is perhaps always 
already co-present.   
 
 
Attention in a state of distraction: what the artist saw        
 
I have argued that theories of attention and attentiveness derived from histories of art 
are capable of revealing something significant about the contemporary economy of 
homeland security culture: that it is not primarily a way of seeing or surveilling the 
world, but rather a means of dividing, isolating, annexing in order to visualize what is 
“unknown”. Yet, it is not only in concepts from the arts, but also in the practices of 
artistic intervention that we find a potentially valuable ethics and responsibility in 
how we pay attention to ourselves and other people. An “absorbed attentiveness”, 
writes Crary, is not only a “necessary part of the individual’s functioning within a 
modern world of economic facts and quantities”, but is always also essential for the 
“creative exceeding of the limits of individuality” (1999: 53). Because relations of 
power inextricably contain the possibility of resistance, there could never be a fully 
efficient attentive subject whose attention to the world is entirely amenable to 
management. Indeed, as Crary has it, “the more one investigated, the more attention 
was shown to contain within itself the condition for its own undoing” (1999: 45-6).  
 
Art theory and practice is all too readily overlooked as “merely cultural” by the social 
sciences, accused of “substituting a trivial form of politics” that focuses on “transient 
events, practices and objects” in place of a “serious” political economy of 
transformation (Butler 1998). I want to suggest here that, even for those who wish to 
pursue what they see as “serious” political economies of transformation – and I 
consider questions of culture to be among the most serious, – artistic interventions in 
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theory and practice are best placed to reflect on many aspects of an emergent 
economy of culture. The embedding of technologies into everyday objects; the 
visualization of unknown futures; the screened projection of mobile bodies; the 
economies of the mundane and the surprising in public space: these are not novel 
ideas to many contemporary artists. Indeed, far from focusing on trivial and transient 
events, innovative artistic practice engages in a deeply historical process of reflection 
on perspective, human subjectivity, and cognition. Put simply, the “resonances” 
(Connolly 2005) that so many of our contemporary philosophers, social theorists and 
political economists are observing across science, technology, politics and culture, 
have long been at the heart of leading edge artistic interventions. I will focus here on 
three areas where I consider artist interventions to open up clear space for questions of 
ethical and political responsibility in face of technical depoliticization. 
 
Modes of attentiveness in contemporary homeland security practice, as I have argued, 
are particularly dependent on algorithmic logics that designate anomaly on the basis 
of a screening of the norm. The cultural practices of the visual arts precisely invert the 
logic of ‘looking out for the out of the ordinary’ – that which transgresses the norm – 
in order to identify danger, suggesting instead that the act of being surprised by the 
extraordinary can make us see the norm anew. Even in quite mainstream installations 
of temporary artworks in public spaces, there is an emphasis on surprise as a means of 
seeing daily life differently. In the spaces of the London Underground, for example, 
Platform for Art has confronted, to a degree, the post 7/7 fear of the unexpected, 
inviting international artists to install their work on the Piccadilly line stations, 
platforms and trains. In the Thin Cities project, the artist’s installations were produced 
in “unexpected places on the Tube network”, offering new ways of seeing the daily 
commute, “revealing new perspectives on London” and “promoting greater 
understanding” (Platform for Art 2006).  
 
In this sense, artistic interventions have capacity to call the norm into question, 
reminding us of what we do not pay attention to, creating what Tom Mitchell says 
“looks like a picture of something we could never see” (2005: 260). This is, argues 
Crary, “experimental activity” that “involves the creation of unanticipated spaces and 
environments in which our visual and intellectual habits are challenged and disrupted” 
(2003: 7). In contrast to an attentiveness that tries to anticipate on the basis of the 
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fragments that are seen, then, some installation artwork in public space offers us new 
ways of attending to the very images we had already screened out as normal. 
American artist Rozalinda Borcila’s Geography Lessons, for example, seeks to 
“intervene in apparently controlled spaces” that are “policed through technologies of 
visualization and information management” (Borcila 2006). Making “counter 
surveillance” videos of airport security and urban transport systems (and deported 
from the Netherlands when she video recorded Schipol airport’s security), Borcila 
projects her multiple screen films, rendering extraordinary what has become the 
ordinary practice of searching, removing shoes, interrogating, detaining (see figure 1).  
 
The question of responsibility in attentive practices of security arises only in terms of 
the responsibility for vigilance, for paying attention and not becoming distracted. As I 
have argued, and following Derrida, there is an absence of responsibility in the sense 
that these forms of attentiveness seek to anticipate, to foresee an unknown future on 
the basis of an algorithmic calculation. If Derrida is correct, then a responsible 
decision would have to “advance where it cannot see”, confronting the difficulty and 
undecidability of all decisions, and recognising that calculation cannot substitute for a 
judgement that may have to be made in the absence of pre-programmed information 
(1992; see also 2001). Artistic interventions, I want to suggest, embody the potential 
to confront the political difficulty of decision and to intervene in ways that are 
‘unanticipatory’, advancing where they cannot see. 
 
What is particularly interesting about artistic practices that engage with some of the 
emergent technologies of attention, is that they do not seek out a resolution to the 
political difficulties posed. Instead, they create a plural space for the articulation of 
difference, “integrating technological tools into plural zones of creative activity” and 
providing ways of imaging the problem outside of narratives of security or 
consumption (Crary 2003: 9). By way of example, consider New York artist Meghan 
Trainor, whose work integrates RFID tags – ubiquitous in the visualization of 
consumers and security ‘threats’ – into public installations and performances (see 
figure 2). The installation “lets viewers encounter RFID tags in an application outside 
of its common commercial or surveillance context”, explains Trainor, “allowing for 
different reactions to its current and expanding ubiquity in our lives” (Trainor 2004).  
Rather than seek to resolve the paradoxes and contradictions of these technological 
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forms of attentiveness, then, the artworks function “as catalyst” to the exposure of 
paradox and contradiction (De Oliveira 2003). They remind us that within apparently 
disciplined and securitized modes of attention there are also interstitial spaces of 
“inattention”, “enchantment” or “reverie” that may work against prejudicial and 
individualised practices (Bennett 2001). The background images and data that are 
discarded by security practices of visualization are potentially recovered by the 
changed perspectives of artistic interventions. 
 
Finally, visionary work in artistic practice has, as its raison d’etre, a form of critique 
that runs ‘against the grain’ of dominant knowledge about how we pay attention to the 
world. In Edward Said’s last book before his death, he documents the ‘late’ work of 
visionary artists and musicians as not that which has “harmony and resolution”, but 
that which embodies “intransigence, difficulty, and unresolved contradiction” (2006: 
14). In contrast to a line of sight that sees clearly and rationally, then, art against the 
grain is that which transgresses prevailing modes of thought in order to see the world 
differently. Thomas Keenan conjures a comparable alternative ‘line’ of sight against 
the grain when he speaks of politics “on the bias”, where there is “a withdrawal of the 
rules or the knowledge on which we might rely to take our decisions for us” (1997: 
166). 
 
In order for responsibility to be reintroduced to the decision, then, it is necessary for 
us to consider this diagonal line of sight that cuts across prevailing ways of attending 
to the world. A final example of such a cut across the grain can be seen in British 
artist Michael Landy’s three year project, Break Down. Situating his work in a disused 
department store on London’s Oxford Street, Landy made an inventory of his life – 
dismantling, weighing and cataloguing every item that he owned. Simulating the 
breaking up, classifying and profiling of individuals through their data, Landy 
stripped his pixelated profile down to nothing, publicly displaying the 7000 
disassembled objects on a moving production line. Because codified data can be used 
to visualize a person, no matter how absurd or tenuous, the artists who experiment 
with alternative ways to visualize a person do so against the grain, offering new 
modes of attention that attend also to the calculation that is made.                                                                
                                                                                                                                                               
Conclusion: citizenship and unknown futures                                                          
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In one reading of the implications of vigilant and anticipatory lines of sight for 
citizenship, a specific embodiment of the citizen is produced: an attentive, watchful 
and watched citizen whose actions and transactions in daily life are called up to secure 
the homeland security state. It is perhaps for this reason that so much attention has 
been paid in recent times, across the social sciences, to the surveillant practices of an 
apparently ‘post 9/11 world’. And yet, as Foucault warned in his lectures on the 
emerging security apparatus, the panopticon is “completely archaic”, and “the oldest 
dream of the oldest sovereign” (2007: 66). In contrast to the “exhaustive surveillance 
of individuals”, a “discipline” that “concentrates, focuses and encloses”, Foucault 
observes an “apparatus of security” that “opens up” to “let things happen” (2007: 44-
5). Where disciplinary modes of surveillance produce particular pictures of people, 
drawn from the ‘survey’ in the conventional sense of ‘surveiller’, what I have 
depicted in this article is a projected picture of a person – one that preempts, 
visualizes and anticipates unknown futures. The citizen appears, then, not only as a 
surveilled picture of a way of life to be verified, checked against criteria and 
documentation, authenticated, but also and perhaps more importantly, as a 
visualization of a potential person who is never quite seen. In terms of material 
effects, the projected people who find themselves on selectee lists for secondary 
checks, or on no-fly lists, or with their assets frozen, are left confronting a digitized 
doppelganger whose associations and profile have become more ‘real’ than even the 
conventions of passport or visa can attain. 
 
There can be little doubt, at least in my sense of the emerging landscape, that much of 
contemporary security practice is assembling around a line of sight that conceals 
racialized and prejudicial judgements inside an apparently ‘expert’ and techno-
scientific visualization. Indeed, as I have suggested, the processes of screening and 
projection precisely rely upon the gaps that are ‘left out’ of association analysis. We 
might even say that misidentification, so-called ‘false positives’ and false hits have 
become essential parts of the accidents that make citizenship and the denial of 
citizenship possible (Nyers 2006). For the British citizens “of Pakistani origin” who 
find themselves projected as as-yet-unknown terrorists, their visualization is achieved 
only via the constant and consistent screening out of other identity claims they could 
make. It is for this reason that I find artistic interventions particularly interesting in 
terms of recovering what is screened out, retrieving the lived detail and rendering it 
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visible. One possible step to take in the political and ethical interventions in security 
visualizations, I have argued, is to expose the distractions and inattentiveness that 
make vigilant visualities possible.  
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Figures 
1. Rozalinda Borcila – Geography Lessons 
 
 
2. Meghan Trainor – With Hidden Numbers 
 
 
                                                 
NOTES 
1 The author acknowledges the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funding of award 
RES 155 25 0087 ‘Contested Borders: Non-Governmental Public Action and the Technologies of the 
War on Terror’. Performance artists Rozalinda Borcila and Meghan Trainor have been much valued 
collaborators and have given generously of their time and images.     
2 In May 2006 the European Court of Justice ruled that the EU-US agreement on the sharing of airline 
passenger data be annulled (Guild and Brouwer 2006). The Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement 
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of 2004 required that airlines submit 34 items of data on each passenger (including , for example, credit 
card details, past travel data and in-flight meal choices, car hire, hotel bookings and other personal 
information) within 15 minutes of flight departure for the US. The PNR data has become central to pre-
emptive border controls, where risk ratings are assigned to individuals in advance of their arrival at a 
border (Amoore 2006).  
3 In a speech to the NATO in 2002, Donald Rumsfeld pondered the importance of taking decisions on 
the basis of an absence of evidence, of taking into account the “unknown unknowns”:  
“The message is that there are no ‘knowns’. There are things we know that we know. There are 
known unknowns. That is to say there are things we know that we don’t know. But there are 
also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know[...] There is another 
way to phrase that and that is the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”.   
Hence, the sense that attention is to be paid to that which is not seen, has not been seen, but can 
nonetheless be ‘projected’.       
4 In common with others who have sought to push economy “beyond economism” – that is, beyond the 
economy as a pre-discursive, pre-political and self-evident material reality – economy is used here to 
denote a field of intervention and a specific means of rendering political life governable (de Goede 
2003; 2005; Miller and Rose 1990). “The art of government”, writes Foucault, “is essentially 
concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy – that is to say, the correct 
manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family – how to introduce this… into the 
management of the state” (1991: 92). Foucault finds in economy a continuity of the art of governing the 
state, such that the “very essence of government” has come to mean “the art of exercising power in the 
form of economy” (93).  
    
5 Reservations databases Amadeus, Galileo and Sabre, used by the major airlines and hotel and other 
travel groups, are now the conduit for the routine submission of passenger data to the US authorities 
before a flight departs for the US. 
6 For Jacques Derrida, a decision is not a decision if it simply redeploys calculative practices in order to 
decide. A decision cannot, in Derrida’s reading, be determined by the acquisition of knowledge, for 
then it is not a decision but “simply the application of a body of knowledge of, at the very least, a rule 
or norm” (1994: 37). An apparent decision taken on the basis of what is ‘seen’ evidentially, via the 
calculations of experts, or in the screened results of algorithmic visualization, is not a decision at all. 
“The decision, if there is to be one”, writes Derrida, “must advance towards a future which is not 
known, which cannot be anticipated” (1994: 37). 
7 As Slavoj Zizek has it: “multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a 
‘racism with a distance’ – it respects the Other’s identity, conceiving of the Other as a self-enclosed 
‘authentic’ community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible 
by his privileged universal position” (2006: 171). Thus, the decision based on a visualized calculation 
is precisely a self-referential form of racism, a racism that disavows itself by stripping out its own role 
in identifying the Other that is threatening and dangerous. 
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